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6Pensions, Risk, and Global Systemically
Important Financial Institutions
Brian Reid and Dan Waters
Following the 2008–10 ﬁnancial crisis, global policymakers enacted some of
the most sweeping ﬁnancial regulatory reforms in the past 70 years. In a
fundamental policy shift, regulators explicitly incorporated monitoring,
mitigating, and managing systemic risk into their regulatory missions or
mandates. Policymakers initially focused on addressing systemic risk in the
banking sector, but in recent years they have broadened their focus to
include nonbank ﬁnancial intermediaries, such as insurance companies,
asset managers, and pension funds.
This chapter summarizes the global discussion surrounding systemic risk.
Speciﬁcally, it focuses on whether pension funds and asset managers that
provide investment products and services to pension plans are sources of
systemic risk. The ﬁrst section brieﬂy describes systemic risk and the institu-
tions policymakers put in place to identify and monitor sources of that risk.
Given that regulators have tended to focus on banks and the prominent role
they played in the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, the second section discusses the
banking model, explains why banks are vulnerable to severe ﬁnancial
shocks, and how the banking model has inﬂuenced regulators’ thinking
on systemic risk in other sectors, speciﬁcally pensions and asset manage-
ment. The ﬁnal sections examine several theories about how pensions, and
the funds in which they invest, could pose risks to the ﬁnancial system.
Deﬁning Systemic Risk
Financial institutions are risk-management organizations. They not only
manage the risks from the assets that they hold or oversee, but also obliga-
tions to shareholders, depositors, pensioners, and others who hold claims
on them or their products. If asset prices decline, a ﬁnancial institution may
not be able to meet those obligations in full. The impact of a ﬁnancial
institution not having sufﬁcient assets to meet its obligations can be idiosyn-
cratic, affecting only those individuals or entities that have direct claims on a
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failed ﬁnancial institution, or systemic, affecting the broader ﬁnancial sys-
tem if a ﬁnancial institution’s failure creates wider damage to the economy.
For example, a deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) pension fund may have insufﬁcient
assets to meet its future obligations to retirees. This shortfall can arise if the
sponsor of the pension plan made insufﬁcient contributions to the plan, or
if asset returns were inadequate. If the pension plan’s sponsor is unwilling or
unable to offset the shortfall, then the plan’s participants and pensioners
will not receive the promised levels of retirement income, causing them
economic harm.
The OECD (2015) highlighted the risk that DB pension funds may not be
able to meet their obligations following a period of prolonged low interest
rates. It noted that because central banks have maintained low interest rates
to spur slow economic growth following the economic downturn in the
United States and Europe, pension funds may face a low interest rate
environment for the foreseeable future. With the current levels of contribu-
tions, low interest rates, and ﬁxed contribution periods, many DB pension
funds will likely not meet their obligations if they are ﬁxed as a ratio of
workers’ earnings. Lower payouts could reduce the well-being of current
and future pensioners. If pension sponsors choose to increase contributions
to shore up these funds, the costs of doing so may impair the proﬁts of the
ﬁrms sponsoring the funds and impose greater burdens on current workers
or taxpayers making contributions to support the funds.
An underfunded DB pension fund may present certain risks for workers,
pensioners, and plan sponsors, but such a fund is unlikely to cause the
ﬁnancial system itself to cease functioning. In assessing risks of systemically
important institutions, regulators have focused on how the collapse of a
single ﬁrm or group of ﬁnancial institutions could create a cascading effect
that encompasses an even larger set of ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial ﬁrms. This
concept of systemic risk adheres most closely to the deﬁnition that Acharya
et al. (2012) and Tarullo (2009) have set forth. They deﬁne systemic risk as
the risk that a ﬁrm or group of ﬁrms will fail and disrupt the ﬁnancial
system’s ability to funnel capital from investors to borrowers, thus causing
damage to the broader economy.
An example of this deﬁnition of systemic risk and the economic break-
down it can cause occurred in the summer of 2007 during the beginning of
the ﬁnancial crisis. It started in the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP)
market. Issuers of ABCP use this short-term debt to ﬁnance credit card
receivables, auto loans, and other medium-term credit. Leading up to the
crisis, some ABCP programs pooled together mortgages and mortgage-
backed securities and used commercial paper to ﬁnance them. As US
housing prices began to fall and default rates rose, some of the funding
programs suffered losses. Banks that had provided credit support to some of
these programs absorbed the losses on their balance sheets (Acharya and
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 30/8/2016, SPi
96 Retirement System Risk Management
Schnabl 2010), but other programs did not have bank credit support and
defaulted on their ABCP. After several ABCP issuers collapsed, lenders
quickly pulled back from similar issuers (Covitz et al. 2013).
This rapid contraction in ABCP led to a pullback in the supply of capital
that helped ﬁnance consumption and investment, and the contraction of
credit caused the broader US economy to tip into a recession. A year later,
following Lehman Brothers’ collapse in September 2008, the commercial
paper market suffered another sharp decline. Investors thought there was
a higher probability that issuers of ﬁnancial paper would default
after Lehman Brothers collapsed (Kacperczyk and Schnabl 2009), and in
response, they reduced their supply of short-term credit to banks and
ﬁnance companies. The contraction of credit to these ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries threatened the collapse of more ﬁnancial institutions and further
damage to the broader economy. These events prompted the Federal
Reserve to provide several emergency credit facilities, including two for
the commercial paper market, to support the ﬂow of short-term credit to
ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial institutions (Duygan-Bump et al. 2013).
This deﬁnition of systemic risk, as illustrated by the preceding example, is
quite broad and has no clear set of boundaries for monitoring and regulat-
ing systemic risks. Historically, central banks have monitored and mitigated
risks in the banking system, but as nonbank ﬁnancial intermediation has
grown, governments have given regulators broad authority to scan the
ﬁnancial landscape for emerging risks and tools to address them.
In the United States, the Dodd–Frank Act, among other things, estab-
lished the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to identify risks to
US ﬁnancial stability, promote market discipline, and respond to emerging
threats to ﬁnancial stability. The FSOC has 10 voting members comprised of
representatives of ﬁnancial regulators and is chaired by the Secretary of the
Treasury. As one of its tools for monitoring and maintaining ﬁnancial
stability, the FSOC can designate nonbank institutions as systemically
important ﬁnancial institutions (SIFIs). The standard for designation is
whether an institution could pose a threat to US ﬁnancial stability because
of its material ﬁnancial distress, or because of the nature, scope, scale,
concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of its activities. Once an institu-
tion is designated, it is subject to enhanced prudential regulation and
consolidated supervision by the Federal Reserve, even if the primary regu-
lator is another federal ﬁnancial regulator. In addition, as speciﬁed by the
Dodd–Frank Act, a SIFI is subject to risk-based capital requirements and
susceptible to paying into a resolution fund in the event of its failure.
In Europe, the Parliament created the European Systemic Risk Board
(ESRB) to coordinate and oversee risks within the European Union.1
The Parliament also extended monitoring and overseeing systemic risk
to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), which assesses
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ﬁnancial risks and works to safeguard the stability of the European Union’s
ﬁnancial system.2
In 2009, the Group of 20 created the Financial Stability Board (FSB) as
a successor to the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), which was founded in
the 1990s to improve coordination and cooperation among national and
international ﬁnancial regulators. Shortly thereafter, the International
Organization of Securities Commissions published revised objectives and
principles of securities regulation, which included a new principle, advising
securities regulators to have—or contribute to—a process to monitor,
mitigate, and manage systemic risk (IOSCO 2010). Internationally, the
Financial Stability Board has taken on the role of identifying sources of
global systemic risk.
Systemic Risk: Expanding the Scope beyond
Banks to Nonbank Financial Institutions
As policymakers broadened their monitoring of systemic risk to include
nonbank ﬁnancial institutions, they drew heavily from their understanding
of how banks contribute to systemic risk. Some of the ﬁrst studies that
examined the connections between banks and nonbank ﬁnancial institu-
tions drew parallels between bank and nonbank intermediated credit, and
thus started referring to nonbanks as ‘shadow banks’ and their activities as
‘shadow banking’. For example, Pozsar et al. (2010) set forth a detailed
description of shadow banking, explaining how nonbank ﬁnancial institu-
tions intermediate credit between borrowers and lenders and how they are
interconnected with banks and the broader ﬁnancial system. Shortly there-
after, the FSB (2011a) released a consultative report on possible systemic
risks in nonbank ﬁnancial institutions and markets, in which it drew
parallels to bank sources of systemic risk and referred to such institutions
as shadow banks.
Shadow banking is a broad term, with various policymakers deﬁning it
differently. As a result, some pension funds and their activities have been
captured under the umbrella of shadow banking, and thus could be ana-
lyzed as sources of systemic risk. For example, while DB pension funds
typically have been excluded from narrow deﬁnitions of shadow banking,
they often are identiﬁed as engaging in shadow banking activities, such as
securities lending or investing in asset-backed securities issued by shadow
banks. Moreover, the FSB (2012) and the IMF (2014) have used even
broader deﬁnitions of shadow banking, which capture DB plans, their
investment activities, and the funds in which they invest.
Products used in deﬁned contribution (DC) plans, such as mutual funds
and other pooled investment products that provide investors daily liquidity by
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allowing plan participants to move assets among these funds, have also been
caught under the shadow banking umbrella. Indeed, some policymakers,
including the IMF (2015), have included such funds in their broad deﬁnition
of shadow banks. Of particular concern have been pooled products that invest
in ﬁxed-income securities or emerging markets. Regulators and even some
market participants have highlighted the risk of investors quickly shifting
from one asset class to another, which could force the managers of those
funds to rapidly sell securities. If those securities trade in illiquid markets,
asset ﬂows could cause sharp declines in prices, leaving many ﬁnancial ﬁrms
temporarily unable to meet their obligations until asset prices return to their
fundamental values. These scenarios paint a picture in which pensions or the
products that they invest in present risks to the overall economy, which could
cause the ﬁnancial system to no longer function.
These concerns about one-sided trades are similar in their nature to bank
runs, once again indicating that ﬁnancial regulators continue to rest heavily
on banking models when examining systemic risk. Yet capital market ﬁnan-
cial intermediation and the ﬁnancial institutions that operate in them, such
as pension funds and asset managers, are fundamentally different from
bank-based ﬁnancing. Next we explain why.
The banking model
Banks are susceptible to collapse and are sources of systemic risk because of
the interplay between their assets and liabilities. Banks hold portfolios of
loans and marketable securities, and these assets rise and fall in value. They
ﬁnance these assets by issuing short- and medium-term debt and deposits.
These borrowings or liabilities have stated nominal values, which create a
ﬁxed set of claims on the banks. Given that the value of banks’ assets can vary
but their liabilities cannot, banks hold capital to help absorb changes in asset
values and to help protect bank depositors and creditors from losses. Yet if a
bank does not have enough capital to absorb a large drop in asset values,
debt holders and uninsured depositors can suffer losses. The interplay
between these risks, banks’ limited ability to absorb losses, and the nature
of banks’ liabilities makes them particularly vulnerable to ﬁnancial and
economic shocks.
When asset prices change, banks’ heavy reliance on debt to ﬁnance their
balance sheets also magniﬁes the effects on their capital. One measure of
the degree to which asset returns are magniﬁed is the balance sheet leverage
ratio. The ratio is calculated by dividing a bank’s balance sheet assets by its
capital. A leverage ratio of 10:1 means a 1 percent decline in the value of a
bank’s assets will cause its capital to fall by 10 percent. Among the largest
banks in the United States, the average balance sheet leverage ratio is 9:1.
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Because banks have limited amounts of capital to absorb losses, uninsured
depositors and other lenders are apt to pull back their funding to banks
during periods of ﬁnancial market stress when asset prices fall sharply. This
was particularly acute during 2008, when investors lending to banks on a
short-term basis were unsure of the solvency of large European and US
banks and reduced their lending to them. The tightened supply of credit
to banks was evident in both higher interest rates that the banks had to pay
for unsecured debt and an overall contraction in the amount of commercial
paper outstanding. For example, interest rates on dollar-denominated com-
mercial paper rose sharply on September 15, 2008, the day that Lehman
Brothers failed, and remained at elevated levels until the Federal Reserve
created two funding facilities that supplied nearly $350 billion in ﬁnancing
to the commercial paper market.
Rapidly rising interest rates can cause several problems for a bank. First,
because many bank assets earn ﬁxed rates of interest, sharply rising short-
term interest rates can cause a bank’s cost of funding to rise faster than its
portfolio income. If its interest costs exceed its interest income, the bank will
suffer losses, which impairs its capital. Second, rising interest rates also cause
assets with ﬁxed interest rates to fall in value, which could result in potential
losses for the bank. Finally, rising interest rates can impair a bank’s ability to
borrow on a secured basis. Banks frequently use bonds and other assets to
collateralize certain types of borrowing, and lenders often require that the
assets used to secure a loan be repriced or marked-to-market, usually on a
daily basis. If interest rates rise and bond prices fall, a bank must post
additional collateral to secure the borrowing. If bond prices fall signiﬁcantly,
the bank may no longer have sufﬁcient collateral at current market prices to
secure the ﬁnancing necessary to fund its portfolio.
Investment and interest rate risks are further compounded for banks
because large portions of bank balance sheets are illiquid, meaning some
of their securities are difﬁcult to sell without incurring losses in value. If a
bank’s borrowers or depositors pull back quickly, the bank may not be able
to sell loans or securities rapidly enough, and at a high enough price, to
cover the ﬁxed value of its liabilities. When a bank has to sell assets for less
than it has valued them, those realized losses are absorbed by its capital,
which erodes the buffer the bank has to protect its uninsured lenders and
depositors. The short-term nature of much of a bank’s borrowings is also
compounded by the problem that a bank’s depositors and other funders can
rapidly pull back their money whenever they choose, leaving the bank
unable to ﬁnance itself in times of ﬁnancial stress. Thus, a downward spiral
of selling assets at ﬁre-sale prices ensues, forcing the bank to realize losses,
which further erodes its capital and leads lenders to pull back even more
before the bank becomes insolvent. This experience, often referred to as a
run, can cause a bank to quickly collapse.
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The interaction between a bank’s investment, interest, and liquidity risks
creates a key link between investment and systemic risk, and it helps explain
why the subprime crisis threatened to bring down large numbers of US and
European banks during the 2008–10 ﬁnancial crisis. While the amount of
outstanding subprime loans was relatively modest, they were held in off-
balance sheet entities that were afﬁliated with banks but had too little capital
to absorb the losses (Acharya and Richardson 2009). As Lehman Brothers
and other ﬁnancial institutions collapsed, prices on certain mortgage-
backed securities fell sharply and threatened the collapse of other banks
and ﬁnancial institutions.
Since 2008, regulators have put a variety of measures in place to shore up
bank balance sheets. While banks are better capitalized than before the
ﬁnancial crisis, they still have a limited ability to withstand a loss in value of
their assets because of their inherent structure and the interest, investment,
and liquidity risks that they have to take on in the course of business.
Moreover, bank balance sheets cannot be isolated from ﬂuctuations in
other sectors of the ﬁnancial market. Thus, regulators have been analyzing
other sectors for systemic risk, including pension funds, asset managers,
and other nonbank ﬁnancial intermediaries (Haldane 2014; Carney 2014;
Tarullo 2015).
Structural differences between pension funds and banks
The structure of DB pension funds differs from banks in two important
respects. DB pension funds typically do not use signiﬁcant amounts of
borrowed money to fund themselves, so portfolio losses do not become
magniﬁed and leave the fund unable to repay its debts. More important,
DB pension fund obligations to pensioners are not redeemable upon
demand. Thus, a DB pension fund does not face a risk of plan participants
quickly pulling their money out of the fund.
Like DB plans, DC plans do not employ leverage. They do, however,
provide plan participants with the ability to move assets between investment
options or even out of the plan. To accommodate this redeemable feature of
DC plans, the investment funds in a plan are typically valued on a daily basis.
Plan participant claims on the funds move dollar for dollar with fund assets.
So while DC plans have immediate claims that are payable on demand, the
claims are always payable in full.
Although DB and DC pension plans are structurally different from banks,
they do rely heavily on other types of ﬁnancial institutions and products that
policymakers have examined for systemic risks. DB or DC plans use either
pooled investment vehicles or separate accounts to invest on behalf of their
beneﬁciaries. DB plans predominantly use separate accounts or collective
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investment funds. DC plans typically use mutual funds or collective invest-
ment funds, although some large plans may also invest their plans’ assets in
separate accounts. A plan sponsor typically will either provide a mandate to
the asset manager to guide the asset allocation strategy and risk proﬁle of
the account, or will select a mutual fund or collective investment fund with a
mandate in accordance with the plan documents. In either case, however,
the failure of an asset manager overseeing a fund’s assets does not have any
impact on the pension fund.
Fundamental differences between asset
management and banks
When policymakers began to look at asset management for sources of
systemic risk, they applied their knowledge of banks to asset managers and
their products. Yet asset managers and the products and services they
provide differ from what banks do. Asset managers do intermediate capital
between investors and borrowers, but unlike banks, asset managers typically
take on little or no investment risk. Rather, investors hire asset managers to
construct portfolios of securities on their behalf with the understanding that
they—not the manager—will absorb the portfolio’s gains and losses.3 This
agency relationship limits the effect of a fund’s performance on an asset
manager’s balance sheet to ﬂuctuations in its management fees. It also
insulates the asset manager’s clients from the manager’s own ﬁnancial
position. For example, if an asset manager cannot continue to operate,
there are strict custody rules in place that protect the customer’s assets
and allow them to be moved to another manager.4
The products that asset managers oversee fall into two main groups:
pooled investment vehicles (funds), and separate accounts. These two prod-
ucts are similar in that asset managers oversee the portfolio construction
and make investment decisions according to client mandates. There is a key
distinction between the two types of products though: in a fund (or pooled
investment vehicle), a fund owns the securities and the investor owns a pro
rata interest in a fund, while in a separate account, the investor owns the
securities directly. In neither case, however, does the asset manager own or
hold the assets, unlike a bank, which holds assets and takes on investment
risk. Instead, with asset management, all the investment risk, including the
gains and losses, passes directly to the investor.
Another distinction between asset management products and banks is the
types of claims that investors have on funds or separate accounts. For
example, as discussed earlier, a DC plan participant’s claims on a pension
fund are not ﬁxed, as they are with a bank account. Asset managers value
investors’ holdings in a fund or a separate account based on current
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securities prices, and they set the price at the end of the day based on the
market close. When asset prices fall, investor claims on a fund or a separate
account decline by an equal amount.
Systemic Risk Concerns about Asset
Managers and Funds
Although regulators acknowledge that asset management products and
services are structured differently from banks, and thus have different risk
proﬁles, they nonetheless have raised concerns about systemic risk in asset
management (FSOC 2014). These concerns can be divided into two broad
categories. The ﬁrst category involves risks presented by an asset manage-
ment ﬁrm. Under this entity-based approach, a regulator could designate an
individual fund or asset manager as systemically important and subject it to
increased supervision or regulation. The second category encompasses risks
presented by asset management products or activities. Under this approach,
a regulator could deem a collection of ﬁnancial products or activities as
systemically risky and subject them to greater regulation or ban them.
Regulators’ concerns about asset managers
Regulators’ concerns about asset managers mainly focus on a ﬁrm’s solvency
and its ability to maintain its services and fund operations. In particular,
regulators are concerned that, if an asset manager fails, it could lead to
disruptions in the ﬁnancial markets either because investors pull back from
the manager’s products, or because the transitioning of a client’s assets and
management to another ﬁrm does not happen smoothly. These concerns
have led the FSB to propose a set of criteria to identify possible investment
funds and asset managers for designation as global nonbank non-insurance
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (FSB 2015). Asset managers
owned by banks and insurance companies would also be considered for
designation, even if the parent ﬁrm was already deemed to be a global SIFI.
The FSB has proposed two threshold tests for asset managers: $100 billion in
balance sheet total assets, or $1 trillion in assets undermanagement. If an asset
manager has assets above these levels, the FSB would consider it for global SIFI
designation based on the FSB’s assessment as to whether the asset manager
could disrupt global ﬁnancial markets if it faced distress or failure. Factors that
the FSB proposes to consider include the ﬁrm’s exposure to counterparties,
the indirect impact the asset manager would have on the ﬁnancial system if it
was forced to liquidate its assets under management, and the critical nature of
the services that it provides and the ability to ﬁnd substitutes.
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Regulator concerns about funds
In addition to possibly designating asset managers as systemically important,
the FSB has proposed two thresholds for initially considering whether
certain funds operated by asset managers should be designated as systemic-
ally important. The ﬁrst threshold is any fund with $100 billion or more in
assets; the second, less inclusive, threshold would be $200 billion in con-
junction with a fund’s overall size and trading relative to the market in which
it is invested. Regulators have proposed designating funds as SIFIs because
of their concerns about potential systemic risks that funds may pose to the
ﬁnancial system. Regulators’ concerns about products and activities have
largely fallen into three areas: credit/default risk, leverage risk, and liquidity
risk. The nature of the concerns has shifted over time, but elements of the
original models remain part of the public discourse (IMF 2014).
Credit/default risk
Credit/default risk is the area that has evolved the most. Initially, bank
regulators were concerned about asset managers creating investment prod-
ucts that ‘transformed credit risk,’ meaning that the actual credit risk is not
borne by investors or that investors perceive that the asset they invest in is
less risky than it actually is (FSB 2011b). These concerns were largely driven
by sponsor support of money market funds. Yet regulators have also recog-
nized that fund and separate account investors (such as pension funds and
401(k) participants) bear the credit risk of their funds, and thus they have
concluded that transformation of credit risk in bond and stock funds is not a
signiﬁcant source of risk in the asset management industry.
Leverage risk
The second concern is the extent to which asset managers provide products
or services that engage in leverage. Mutual funds, Exchange Traded Funds
(ETF), and Undertakings for the Collective Investment of Transferable
Securities (UCITS) funds have strict limits on their use of leverage. For
example, US mutual funds and ETFs must hold three dollars of assets for
every dollar they borrow, and DC plans using such products also have
limited leverage.
Asset management products can engage in leverage in a variety of ways. For
example, a fund could borrow from a bank and invest the loan in fund assets,
which magniﬁes the gains and losses to the nondebt holders. Alternatively, a
fund could borrow through securities lending. For example, a DB plan may
lend out securities and reinvest the proceeds from the lending in similar
securities, amplifying the returns on that fund. Another form of leverage can
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arise through the use of derivatives, whereby the fund engages in a derivative
transaction that increases the portfolio’s risk rather than hedging it. This is
particularly true if the collateral held against the portfolio is of a similar risk
proﬁle as the derivative position itself. These forms of borrowing, however,
are restricted under Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules for
mutual funds and other regulated investment pools. Other types of asset
management products, such as hedge funds, may use greater amounts of
leverage, and DB plans are eligible to invest in such funds.
In practice, most regulated funds and even other types of investment
products have relatively modest levels of leverage relative to banks. For
example, the average balance sheet leverage ratio for the largest US mutual
funds and ETFs is 1.04:1. In contrast, banks rely heavily on debt to ﬁnance
their balance sheets, with 9:1 being the average balance sheet leverage ratio
for the largest US banks. The implication is that, for regulated funds, and
even for hedge funds, asset management products can experience large
ﬂuctuations in price without causing a fund’s or separate account’s assets to
be less than its borrowings.
Liquidity risk
Liquidity risk is the third concern regulators have regarding the potential
systemic risk that asset managers might pose to ﬁnancial stability (FSB
2011b; FSOC 2014). One of the distinguishing features of many types of
funds is that they will buy back an investor’s shares on a daily basis; this is also
known as offering daily redemptions. Regulators are concerned that this
activity—coupled with some of the securities that certain funds hold—could
present a liquidity risk. Speciﬁcally, regulators have hypothesized that
if investors sell their interest in bond funds during a period of ﬁnancial
market stress, the funds may not be able to sell their assets to meet these
orders, or their actions may cause prices in the bond markets to fall sharply
(OFR 2013).
Feroli et al. (2014) have argued that such ‘herding behavior’ can distort
markets, and lead securities prices to over- or undershoot their fundamental
value. Because of the possibility that forced sales of securities could cause
prices to fall below their previous day’s value, a fund may not be able to sell
its holdings for what it priced them the previous day. Hence shareholders
leaving a fund may get a better price than what the portfolio manager could
achieve when selling the assets, causing the remaining shareholders to
absorb the difference. In this event, investors may have an advantage in
leaving a fund before other investors, particularly during periods of market
stress. This advantage is often referred to as a ‘ﬁrst-mover advantage,’ and
some regulators theorize that it could cause sharp investor movements out
of funds and thus amplify a market downturn.
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Collins and Plantier (2014) have noted that this is not a new concern, as it
has resurfaced numerous times since the 1920s, particularly after periods of
rapid fund growth. They argue that there is no evidence that fund sales of
securities materially affect market prices. While ﬂows and fund returns are
positively correlated, the direction of causation is sensitive to the identifying
assumptions used to structure empirical tests. In addition, they note that
investors who own securities directly could also cause prices to fall if a large
number sought to sell their holdings at once.
Regulators such as the IMF (2015) and FSOC (2014) have countered that
fund investors are more likely to sell during a period of market stress than if
fund investors held the securities directly. Accordingly they have sought to
better understand how investing through collective vehicles may lead to
greater systemic risks than investing in securities through direct ownership.
For example, FSOC (2014) has theorized that there are two other potential
sources of cost transfers: the trading costs and liquidity costs that a fund
incurs by selling securities to meet an investor’s redemptions. Accordingly,
regulators have explored two hypotheses about how these cost transfers
could be sources of systemic risk.
Theories about investor runs and liquidity costs
First-mover advantage and trading costs
The ﬁrst theory about investor runs and liquidity costs is that the actual
trading costs are borne by investors staying in a fund with outﬂows. Fund
costs, as well as investment gains and losses, are shared on a pro rata basis
among investors. But if a fund investor leaves a fund and the fund manager
must sell securities to accommodate the redemption, investors who stay with
the fund may bear a larger share of the trading costs. Thus if an investor
leaves early from a fund that subsequently experiences more redemptions
and portfolio sales, that early or ﬁrst investor could be exposed to lower fund
costs than those investors who remain behind and could therefore have a
ﬁrst-mover advantage.
US fundmanagers, however, have the ability to manage these costs so as to
not disadvantage their remaining shareholders. First, fund managers are
required to mark-to-market their fund portfolios on a daily basis using
forward pricing and fair valuation methods to avoid predictable price move-
ments. Many managers are required to either use the price that they could
sell the security for, known as the bid price, or the price that is at the mid-
point between the bid and ask price. The ask price is the price at which the
manager could buy the security. Using a bid- or mid-price passes some of the
trading costs along to investors leaving a fund, because this pricing method
values the shares near to what the fund would receive if it needed to sell
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assets to accommodate the redemption. Another way that funds manage
costs is by imposing redemption fees on investors who leave a fund within a
certain window of time after investing in the fund. In addition, most funds
also reserve the right to redeem shares in kind if investors with particularly
large trades want to redeem quickly, so that rather than receiving cash, the
investor is paid with a slice of securities. Pooled products such as mutual
funds or collective investment funds often have the option to redeem in-
kind if the retirement plan sponsor has not given sufﬁcient warning that it is
removing its plan from the fund.
European fund managers have other techniques for limiting the effect of
shareholder ﬂows on remaining investors. UCITS funds are allowed to use
swing pricing, whereby they set a price based on market prices and whether
the fund received net inﬂows or outﬂows for the day. The difference
between the two prices can ﬂuctuate and will reﬂect the cost of accommo-
dating the shareholder ﬂows on a given day. UCITS also can use dilution
levies, which are charges that investors entering or exiting a fund pay to
compensate other shareholders. Finally, UCITS can use gates on their funds
to limit the redemptions in any given time period.
These and other techniques help minimize the costs of meeting share-
holder redemptions. One measure of these techniques’ efﬁcacy is the tracking
error on index funds: this is the difference between an index fund’s return and
the total return of the index it tracks. If shareholder ﬂows cause funds to trade
and incur transaction or liquidity costs, as regulators have hypothesized, then
index funds with outﬂows should have larger tracking errors.
Figure 6.1 plots tracking errors for US bond index funds against the
monthly net new cash ﬂows to such funds, where the target index is the
Barclays US Aggregate Bond index. The chart examines monthly data from
January 2010 to December 2014, during which there was a large increase in
the demand for bond funds. If the regulators’ hypothesis is correct, then the
ﬁgure should show a tight correlation between fund ﬂows and tracking
error. As seen, there is no such relationship, either visually or statistically.
Indeed, there are many observations in the upper left quadrant that repre-
sent cases where bond index funds had outﬂows and investors in the fund
saw their returns rise relative to its benchmark index, which is precisely the
reverse of what the hypothesized scenario would suggest. Even considering
only those months where these bond index funds had outﬂows and there
was a negative tracking error (the lower left quadrant), there is no relation-
ship between fund ﬂows and fund tracking error.
The absence of any meaningful correlation between fund ﬂows and
tracking error on a monthly basis suggests that fund managers can and do
employ tools to manage the impact of these ﬂows. This therefore undercuts
the regulators’ theory that investors who stay in a fund with outﬂows bear the
actual trading costs. This does not mean that all fund managers use these
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tools to the same degree or efﬁcacy, but it does indicate that more research
needs to be done to explore whether current trading techniques available to
fund managers are sufﬁcient to limit the impact of trading costs on fund
performance.
First-mover advantage and liquidity asset management
The second theory is that a fund manager may try to initially avoid incurring












–50 –30 –10 10 30 50
















Net new cash flow (as a percentage of previous month’s assets)
Figure 6.1 Bond index funds’ ﬂows are unrelated to their tracking errors ( January
2010–December 2014)
Note : Tracking error is the difference between a fund’s gross return and the total return on the
fund’s benchmark index. The bond index funds in this chart track either the Barclays Aggregate
Bond Total Return index or the Barclays Aggregate Bond Float Adjusted Total Return index.
Source : Initially appeared in ICI (2015).
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with less liquid, harder-to-value securities. Investors who remain in the fund
would then be exposed to higher future liquidation and trading costs if
additional investors left the fund. This theory of using the most liquid assets
to meet investor outﬂows is sometimes referred to as a ‘waterfall’ theory of
asset management.
Alternatively, if an asset manager does not want to alter the basic construct
of the portfolio, it can sell both liquid and illiquid securities to accommo-
date outﬂows. As noted, both mutual funds and collective investment funds
have investment mandates which they must adhere to. Thus, the hypothesis
that asset managers would accommodate ﬂows by selling their most liquid
assets ﬁrst would quickly cause the fund to deviate from its investment
mandate.
One test of this hypothesis is to examine changes in cash positions of
funds that may have more difﬁculty in selling securities, such as high-yield
bond funds. For these funds, asset managers may be more inclined to use
cash and other liquid assets to accommodate investor ﬂows, leaving remain-
ing investors at greater risk. One way to measure how asset managers adjust
their funds’ portfolios is to compare funds’ cash ratio (the portion of the
portfolio allocated to cash) over periods of time, including during periods of
market stress.
Figure 6.2 plots the industry average cash ratio of high-yield bond
funds over the 15-year period from 2000 to 2014. In aggregate, cash balances
for high-yield bond funds averaged 6.26 percent of those funds’ assets. The




























































Figure 6.2 ‘Cash’ ratio of high-yield bond funds: percentage of fund assets (monthly,
January 2000–December 2014)
Note : Data exclude high-yield bond funds designated as ﬂoating-rate funds.
Source : Initially appeared in ICI (2015).
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below 3.8 percent of fund total assets. Most notably, the cash ratio did not
fall perceptibly during recent periods of net cash outﬂows from high-yield
bond funds. For example, during the ﬁnancial crisis, the cash ratio for high-
yield bond funds rose, from 6.29 percent in August 2008 to 11.89 percent in
December 2008, exactly the opposite of the result of the hypothetical
‘waterfall’ scenario.
As another example, long-term interest rates rose sharply in the United
States in May and June 2013, reﬂecting anticipated changes in monetary
policy. In June 2013, net outﬂows from high-yield bond funds totaled 4.4
percent of funds’ total assets, which was modest as a percentage of funds’
assets but large by historical standards. The cash ratio for high-yield bond
funds, however, rose slightly from 4.44 percent in May 2013 to 4.53 percent
in June 2013, a development also contrary to the waterfall theory of portfolio
management.
Table 6.1 provides a statistical analysis of these concepts for high-yield
bond funds. Using monthly fund-by-fund data, the table shows results of
regressions of changes in the cash ratio for high-yield funds against their net
new cash ﬂows. If the waterfall theory is correct (i.e., that shareholder
outﬂows tend to deplete funds’ cash holdings), the ‘slope’ coefﬁcients
(labeled as Beta in the table) should be positive and substantially greater
than zero. Also, the regressions should ﬁt the data ‘well’ in the sense that
the R2 should be sizeable. The table shows results for a number of different
time periods. For each period, the ﬁgure provides three regressions that use:
(1) all observations in a given period (all net new cash ﬂow); (2) observations
with positive net new cash ﬂow (net new cash ﬂow  0); and (3) observations
with negative net new cash ﬂow (net new cash ﬂow < 0).
As seen, the regressions provide little if any support for the waterfall
theory. The slope coefﬁcients (Beta) are considerably less than 1.0 and
generally less than 0.20. Taken at face value, that suggests that individual
fund cash ratios do rise and fall modestly as the funds experience net cash
inﬂows or outﬂows. For example, for the period 2000–14, the Beta for net
new cash ﬂow < 0 is 0.18, which indicates that a fund that begins the month
with a cash ratio of 4 percent and experiences net cash outﬂows of 7 percent
of its assets would have a cash ratio of 2.75 percent by month-end, still well
above zero.5
The lack of a meaningful relationship between a fund’s net new cash ﬂows
and its cash ratio is underscored by examining crisis periods. For example,
during the height of the ﬁnancial crisis from September to November 2008,
there is no evidence of any relationship between net new cash ﬂows to high-
yield bond funds and their cash ratios. The same is true of June 2013, the
Taper Tantrum period; during that month, high-yield bond funds had
signiﬁcant total outﬂows, but those outﬂows had no apparent effect on the
funds’ cash positions.
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To provide a visual example of the lack of a relationship between net
cash ﬂow and cash ratios, Figure 6.3 plots net new cash ﬂows to individual
high-yield bond funds against the change in each fund’s cash ratio in June
2013. If the waterfall theory is accurate, the observations in the chart
should line predominantly along the dashed 45-degree line. In other
words, according to the waterfall narrative, outﬂows should deplete
funds’ cash balances while inﬂows should increase them. In fact, the
observations in the chart are distributed essentially randomly around the
vertical and horizontal axes, suggesting that there is no statistical relation-
ship between net new cash ﬂows and changes in funds’ cash positions. Even
if one focuses only on those high-yield bond funds that had outﬂows in
June 2013 (a number of high-yield bond funds did have inﬂows), the
posited relationship is absent.
TABLE 6.1. Net new cash ﬂows have small effect on cash ratios of high-yield bond
funds
Regression Results
Period Alpha (Std error) Beta (Std error) R2
2000–2006 All net new cash ﬂow 0.06 (0.07) 0.13 (0.01) 0.015
Net new cash ﬂow  0 0.23 (0.13) 0.09 (0.02) 0.007
Net new cash ﬂow < 0 0.05 (0.10) 0.18 (0.02) 0.015
2007–2009 All net new cash ﬂow 0.07 (0.12) 0.14 (0.01) 0.029
Net new cash ﬂow  0 0.10 (0.21) 0.14 (0.02) 0.035
Net new cash ﬂow < 0 0.16 (0.17) 0.22 (0.05) 0.013
2010–2014 All net new cash ﬂow 0.11 (0.08) 0.20 (0.01) 0.067
Net new cash ﬂow  0 0.20 (0.13) 0.22 (0.01) 0.071
Net new cash ﬂow < 0 0.16 (0.10) 0.16 (0.02) 0.031
2000–2014 All net new cash ﬂow 0.08 (0.05) 0.17 (0.01) 0.036
Net new cash ﬂow  0 0.05 (0.09) 0.16 (0.01) 0.035
Net new cash ﬂow < 0 0.05 (0.07) 0.18 (0.01) 0.019
Sep.–Nov. 2008 All net new cash ﬂow 0.07 (0.39) 0.17 (0.06) 0.005
Net new cash ﬂow  0 0.45 (1.06) 0.13 (0.09) 0.032
Net new cash ﬂow < 0 0.14 (0.57) 0.19 (0.16) 0.007
June 2013 All net new cash ﬂow 0.15 (0.42) 0.01 (0.05) 0.000
Net new cash ﬂow  0 0.08 (1.54) 0.13 (0.19) 0.029
Net new cash ﬂow < 0 0.21 (0.50) 0.04 (0.06) 0.006
Note : Change in cash as percent of fund asset = α + β net new cash ﬂow; selected periods.
Data exclude mutual funds that invest in other mutual funds, variable annuities, any
fund with less than $10 million in total net assets, funds speciﬁcally designed for frequent
trading, funds designated as ﬂoating rate funds, and any fund-month where a merger or
liquidation takes place for a fund. Bolded coefﬁcients denote statistical signiﬁcance at the
5 percent level.
Source : Initially appeared in ICI (2015).
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In short, even during periods of market stress, the data do not support
the notion that outﬂows cause funds to deplete their cash balances to the
detriment of remaining fund shareholders. This theory is key to some of the
policy prescriptions that regulators are recommending, so it is important for
them to better understand how asset managers operate their funds, particu-




















Net new cash flow
Correlation (flows > 0) = 0.170Correlation (flows < 0) = –0.075
Figure 6.3 High-yield bond funds’ change in cash ratio are unrelated to their ﬂows:
percentage of previous period total net assets ( June 2013)
Note: Data excludemutual funds that invest in other mutual funds, variable annuities, funds with
less than $10 million in total net assets in June 2013, funds designed for frequent trading, funds
designated as ﬂoating rate funds, and any fund-month where a merger or liquidation takes
place for a fund.
Source : Initially appeared in ICI (2015).
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Fund Flows during Down Markets: Historical
Experience
Although regulators have raised theoretical concerns about why investors
might rapidly sell their fund shares and thus create risks to the ﬁnancial
system, historical experience provides little support for the theories that
outﬂows from stock and bond funds would be so large as to pose systemic
risk. Even though there have been periods of outﬂows from both types
of funds, they have been modest when measured as a share of the existing
fund assets or as a percentage of market transactions. For example,
during the fall of 2008, outﬂows from stock and bond funds were a
modest share of the existing fund assets in total. As Collins and Plantier
(2014) explain, a reason for this is that a large portion of the assets held
in stock and bond funds are held by retail investors, and these investors
tend to move slowly.
The absence of large outﬂows from stock and bond funds suggests that
either the economic value of the ﬁrst-mover advantage is modest, or that the
costs of doing so are greater than the beneﬁts. The hypothesis assumes that
the market impact from sales of fund securities in succeeding days is large
enough to create a meaningful incentive for investors to try to time the
markets. For a number of reasons, this is highly uncertain. For example, an
investor might decide on the basis of a declining market today to redeem
out of a fund, only to ﬁnd the market rebounding tomorrow. Thus the
redeeming investor is, in effect, trying to time the markets, a behavior
against which academics and ﬁnancial advisors have long cautioned fund
investors. Certain investors must also consider taxes; for instance, an
investor who redeems may incur a current tax liability because of capital
gains. Also, the number of times an investor could seek to gain from this
behavior (redeeming in an attempt to avoid market impact or other fund
trading costs) is limited by frequent-trading costs or restrictions imposed by
funds or 401(k) plans.
For instance, each of the 100 largest mutual funds has prospectus lan-
guage indicating that it monitors for frequent trading and either imposes
explicit controls to limit that activity or has the ability to bar frequent
traders. Additionally, if fund investors can correctly anticipate a market
impact tomorrow from fund redemptions today, so too can hedge funds
and other institutional traders. But institutional traders have the distinct
advantage of being able to execute a trade at any point during the trading
day (or even before the trading day through derivatives markets). As a
result, institutional traders may be able to arbitrage away any market impact
effect well before investors in a mutual fund held inside a 401(k) plan or an
individual retirement account (IRA) could execute an order, which is at the
market closing price.
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Another reason that destabilizing outﬂows have not been observed is that
investors in retirement accounts have long investment horizons and tend
not to trade heavily, even during periods of market stress. Surveys of record-
keeper data undertaken by the Investment Company Institute since the fall
of 2008 indicate that 401(k) investors are unlikely to make large shifts in
their asset allocations or stop contributing to their plans, even during the
height of the ﬁnancial crisis (Holden and Schrass 2015). As Figure 6.4
shows, DC plans and IRAs had modest outﬂows in the fourth quarter of
2008, amounting to slightly more than $50 billion; these outﬂows were only
about 1.5 percent of DC and IRA assets.
A ﬁnal reason that fund ﬂows tend to be muted, even during periods of
market stress, is that most investors use ﬁnancial advisors and brokers
when investing outside of a DC plan. During periods of stress, these advisors
likely discourage their clients from timing the markets and moving into
and out of funds. In the past few years, though, a number of ﬁrms
have begun to experiment with automated, online advisory services known
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Figure 6.4 Deﬁned contribution (DC) plan and IRA ﬂows to long-termmutual funds
Source : Authors’ calculations.
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as robo-advisors. These services provide asset allocation and automatic rebal-
ancing of investments for clients inside DC plans, IRAs, and taxable accounts.
Since these services are new and have not yet been tested during periods of
market stress, it is unclear how they will perform and whether they could lead
to herding as the programs rebalance portfolios away from asset classes that
have recently fallen in price or if they could help stabilize markets as the
programs rebalance investors’ portfolios into asset classes with falling prices.
One of the few times when funds experienced sizeable outﬂows
globally was in October 2008, when outﬂows from European-based bond
funds totaled nearly 10 percent of fund assets. The outﬂows occurred when
various government regulators sought to stem a potential run on European
banks and provided new guarantees to bank deposits. These guarantees
were unlimited, rather than being capped at a certain deposit amount,
and they covered new money that was placed in the banks. This prompted
investors in European funds to sell their shares in funds and deposit their
proceeds in banks. But rather than being evidence of a structural weakness
of funds, this experience indicates that policy responses during periods of
market stress can potentially be destabilizing if they are not well formulated.
Conclusion
Policymakers and regulators are in the early stages of understanding sources
of systemic risk and its transmission outside the banking sector. As they have
turned their attention to the pension and asset management industries, they
have relied heavily on an understanding of how banks contribute to systemic
risk. Yet pension funds and asset managers are fundamentally different from
banking in terms of their structure and risk proﬁle. Despite these differ-
ences, some regulators have raised concerns about activities that pension
funds engage in and about asset managers and their products and services.
Policymakers have posed theories about how asset managers and their funds
could be sources of systemic risk. Historical and empirical evidence about
funds and investor behavior provide little support for these theories. Yet
despite this evidence, global bodies such as the FSB have moved much closer
to designating asset managers and their funds—possibly even large pension
funds—as global SIFIs. The implications for plan participants and the
regulatory consequences outside the United States are uncertain. In the
United States, however, the implications are much clearer. If the FSOC
chose to designate some funds or asset managers as SIFIs, this could cause
a small group of funds and their investors, including pension plan partici-
pants, to bear signiﬁcant costs upon designation (or in the event of a future
collapse of another SIFI). Such costs could create large disincentives for
pension funds to use any fund or asset manager designated as a SIFI.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 30/8/2016, SPi
Pensions, Risk, and Global SIFIs 115
Endnotes
1. More information on the ESRB’s mission and activities is available at https://www.
esrb.europa.eu.
2. More information on ESMA’s mission and activities is available at http://www.
esma.europa.eu/.
3. The deﬁnition of a ‘security’ under US federal securities laws is broad. Under the
Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Securities Act of 1933, a security
includes, among other instruments, any note, stock, bond, debenture, evidence
of indebtedness, or certiﬁcate of interest or participation in any proﬁt-sharing
agreement.
4. For a general description of custody principles in the context of funds, see IOSCO
(2014).
5. Formally speaking, the results also indicate that the link between net new cash
ﬂow and changes in a fund’s cash ratio is statistically signiﬁcant. That, however,
is likely somewhat of an artifact due to the very large samples in the cases
where the regressions span periods of several years. For instance, the regression
for 2000–14 based on ‘net new cash ﬂow < 0’ is highly statistically signiﬁcant
(a very small standard error, just 0.01), no doubt in part because the regression
uses 9,527 observations. Consequently, the statistical signiﬁcance of the regres-
sion coefﬁcients is not the best indicator of the value of the strength or
weakness of the relationship between a fund’s cash ratio and its net new cash
ﬂows. More important however, the relationship does not ﬁt the data well at all
(the R2 averages about 0.03—i.e., 3%—for the multi-year periods). In fact,
there is nearly a complete lack of any relationship, which is contrary to the
‘waterfall’ theory of portfolio management, but consistent with the reality of
funds’ carefully managing their portfolios (including cash balances) to accom-
modate investor inﬂows and outﬂows while adhering to the fund’s investment
objectives.
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